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INTERSTATE CLAIMS: THEIR HISTORY
AND THEIR CHALLENGES
Mark D. Esterle*
This Article provides an overview of the cases and statutes relating
to interstate claims for unemployment compensation. The author
suggests that the current federal statutes and regulations are inade-
quate on the grounds that they are ambiguous, lead to inconsistent
results in different states, and may fail to ensure due process in
claims determinations. The author highlights these problems with
regard to interstate fact finders, attorney representation, witness
subpoenas, and access to judicial review. Finally, he points to
regulations that cover interstate unemployment compensation claims
by federal employees and military servicemembers as models for new
regulations of uniform application.
INTRODUCTION
In an interstate claim for unemployment compensation
benefits, the claimant has worked in one or more states and
then files a claim for benefits in another state. The states may
be adjacent or very distant. According to federal statistics,
from January 1, 1993, through October 31, 1994, approximate-
ly 1.5 million interstate claims for unemployment compensa-
tion were filed.' This considerable number of interstate claims
filings makes the issues that the unemployed and their
advocates face significant. These issues include: Which state's
law controls in determining the claimant's eligibility? How can
a claimant obtain legal representation for a hearing conducted
in the state where he was last employed? If the hearing is
conducted by telephone, how can the claimant subpoena neces-
sary witnesses who reside in another state? How does a claim-
ant obtain judicial review? Is the claimant even entitled to
unemployment benefits?
* Attorney, Cumberland Trace Legal Services, Bowling Green, Kentucky. B.A.
1973, Vanderbilt University; J.D. 1976, University of Kentucky College of Law.
1. See Statistics obtained from Cynthia L. Ambler, Unemployment Insurance
Service, United States Department of Labor 1 (Nov. 23, 1994) [hereinafter Statistics of
Cynthia L. Ambler] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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Because we live in a mobile economy in a federal system,
the option of filing interstate claims is important. Although
the United States Department of Labor (USDOL) monitors
how quickly states process interstate claims, it has not estab-
lished standards that measure the quality of interstate deter-
minations.2 This Article will provide a brief overview of federal
law on unemployment compensation, exploring the legislative
history of interstate claims law and implementing regulations,
while focusing on Kentucky as a sample state to show how
state law can complicate interstate claims. Case examples will
demonstrate the need for reform in interstate claims process-
ing in areas such as non-combined wage claims, attorney
representation, witness subpoenas, and the right to judicial
review. This Article advocates that the USDOL or Congress
address these issues and weed out the unnecessary pitfalls in
interstate claims litigation, using as guidance existing federal
regulations for processing the interstate claims of former gov-
ernment and military employees.
I. OVERVIEW OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROVISIONS
To illuminate the difficulties involved in filing an interstate
claim, it is first necessary to discuss the history of unemploy-
ment compensation as well as the legislative history of inter-
state claims.3 The Social Security Act, containing requirements
for federal-state unemployment compensation programs, was
signed into law by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1935. 4
The Act was meant to provide temporary relief to any. recently
unemployed worker, "at a time when otherwise he would have
nothing to spend."5 Unemployment compensation was to assist
the worker while he looked for "substantially equivalent em-
ployment."6 Congress also viewed unemployment insurance as
2. See UNEMPLOYMENT INS. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT INSUR-
ANCE QUALITY APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 94, at 57-69 (1994).
3. The United States Supreme Court discussed the history of unemployment
compensation law in California Department of Human Resources Development v.
Java, 402 U.S. 121, 130-33 (1971).
4. Social Security Act, ch. 531, § 303, 49 Stat. 620, 626 (1935) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 503 (1994)); see Java, 402 U.S. at 130-31.
5. See Java, 402 US. at 131.
6. See id. at 132 (quoting statement of the Secretary of Labor).
FALL 1995-WINTER 1996]
a way to stabilize industry7 by providing unemployed workers
with money to purchase necessary goods and services and
thereby preventing the decline of other industries.'
Accordingly, the federal government provides funds for un-
employment compensation programs that are administered by
the states. All state unemployment compensation programs
are financed in part by grants from the federal government
under the Social Security Act.9 Under the Act, no grant may
be made to a state for a fiscal year unless the Secretary of
Labor certifies the amount to be paid, 10 and the Secretary may
not certify payment of federal funds unless the state's program
conforms to federal requirements."
The Social Security Act contains numerous other require-
ments constraining the ability of the Secretary of Labor to
grant payments to states under their unemployment compen-
sation programs. For example, individuals whose claims for
unemployment compensation have been denied must have an
opportunity for a fair hearing. 2 In addition, the USDOL has
promulgated regulations to assure that states comply with
prompt payment of benefits. 3
Congress has adopted other relevant unemployment com-
pensation provisions since the Act was enacted. For example,
states must now assure payment of unemployment compensa-
tion to federal civilian employees.'4 Similar legislation protects
honorably discharged armed forces personnel. 5 In addition,
7. See id.
8. See id. at 132-33.
9. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-503 (1994).
10. See id. § 502(a).
11. See id. § 503(a). For example, state unemployment compensation laws must
"insure full payment of unemployment compensation when due." Id. § 503(a)(1). In
Java, the Supreme Court found a violation of this requirement where the state of
California stopped unemployment benefit payments if the claimant's employer filed an
appeal. 402 U.S. at 128. Even if the claimant eventually prevailed, he would have
subsisted for seven to ten weeks without benefits because of the referee's delay in
reaching a decision. Id. at 128, 133-35. The Supreme Court held that California's
delay in payment violated the Social Security Act because California's procedure
frustrated "the congressional objective of getting money into the pocket of the unem-
ployed worker at the earliest point that is administratively feasible." Id. at 135.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(3).
13. E.g., 20 C.F.R. pts. 640, 650 (1995) (establishing standards for promptness in
benefit payments and in appeals).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 8502 (1994).
15. Id. § 8521(b). Regulations pertaining to unemployment compensation pro-
grams for civil servants and ex-servicemembers may be found at 20 C.F.R. pts. 609,
614 (1995). These provisions specify which state's law will apply. Id. §§ 609.8,
614.8-.9.
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Congress has adopted the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
(FUTA).' s The Social Security Act also requires the Secretary
of Labor to ensure state compliance with the FUTA.
17
A. FUTA and Interstate Claims
In 1970, the FUTA was amended to include a provision on
interstate claimants and unemployment compensation. 18 As
the Act's legislative history shows, prior to 1970, agreements
among the states to handle claims for unemployment com-
pensation were voluntary.' 9 In most instances, the voluntary
agreements worked fairly well.2' However, if even a small
number of states refused to honor other states' agreements on
unemployment benefits, the result was inequitable.2' For ex-
ample, some states penalized workers merely because they
had worked and become unemployed in another state; not only
was this inequitable, but such a provision had the potential to
inhibit worker mobility, which Congress found important to
the economy.2 2
States that did not have voluntary agreements adversely
affected "highly skilled, highly motivated, and highly mobile
workers" who worked for several employers in several states
during the course of one year before losing employment.23
Because base-wage periods 24 of the states varied so much,
many unemployed mobile workers either did not receive unem-
ployment benefits or received benefits that were much lower
16. Federal Unemployment Tax Act, ch. 23, 68A Stat. 439 (1954) (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1994)).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a).
18. Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, § 121, 84
Stat. 695, 701-02 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a) (1994)); see also S. REP. No. 752,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3606, 3625-26.
19. S. REP. No. 752, supra note 18, at 22, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3625.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 22, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3625-26.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 23, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3626.
24. Base-wage periods determine whether a worker has earned enough wages to
receive unemployment benefits as well as the amount of benefits the worker is to
receive. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 341.090 (Michie 1995) (defining "base period"
as "the first four (4) of the last five (5) completed calendar quarters immediately
preceding the first day of a worker's benefit year"); id. § 341.350(5) (defining the
qualifications that a claimant's base-period wage must meet). Each state may have a
different base-wage requirement for a worker to be eligible to receive benefits in that
state.
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than what they should have received.25 Many employees who
worked in several states for the same employer before losing
their jobs faced this same loss of benefits.26
Congress amended the FUTA to correct these problems, so
that states could not deny or reduce unemployment benefits
solely because a worker filed a claim in another state or be-
cause the worker resided in another state at the time she filed
the claim for benefits.2 In addition, the FUTA now requires
the states to participate in wage-combining agreements. 28 If
the claimant worked in several different states, her wages
from those states are now combined when determining mone-
tary eligibility, using the base period of a single state. 29 For
wage-combining purposes, the Senate Committee on Finance
expected that the base period of the paying state would be
used, although this was not delineated in the statute.3 °
B. Regulations Implementing the FUTA in Interstate Claims
On December 28, 1971, the USDOL promulgated regulations
on interstate arrangements for combining wages and on laws
25. S. REP. No. 752, supra note 18, at 22-23, reprinted in 1970 US.C.C.A.N. at 3626.
26. Id. at 23, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3626.
27. See 26 US.C. § 3304(a)(9)(A).
28. Id. § 3304(a)(9)(B).
29. See id.
30. S. REP. No. 752, supra 18, at 23, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3626.
The FUTA interstate wage claim provision reads in full:
(9)(A) compensation shall not be denied or reduced to an individual solely
because he files a claim in another State (or a contiguous country with which the
United States has an agreement with respect to unemployment compensation) or
because he resides in another State (or such a contiguous country) at the time he
files a claim for unemployment compensation;
(B) the State shall participate in any arrangements for the payment of compen-
sation on the basis of combining an individual's wages and employment covered
under the State law with his wages and employment covered under the unem-
ployment compensation law of other States which are approved by the Secretary
of Labor in consultation with the State unemployment compensation agencies as
reasonably calculated to assure the prompt and full payment of compensation in
such situations. Any such arrangement shall include provisions for
(i) applying the base period of a single State law to a claim involving the
combining of an individual's wages and employment covered under two or
more State laws, and
(ii) avoiding duplicate use of wages and employment by reason of such com-
bining.
26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(9).
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of application. 31 The purpose of these regulations is to allow an
unemployed worker with covered employment in more than
one state to combine those wages in order to qualify for unem-
ployment benefits or to receive more benefits in one state.32
The "states" include all fifty states of the United States, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.33
This means that the Secretary has the laws of fifty-three
jurisdictions to consider. Standards prescribed by the Secre-
tary apply to interstate claims filed under this arrangement.34
Yet the states' unemployment agencies still must cooperate
with each other.3' The Secretary must resolve any disagree-
ment about the operation of the arrangements, with the advice
of designated state agency representatives.36
Although the regulations define several terms, the most
important for the purposes of this Article are the definitions of
"paying state" and of "transferring state." If the claimant has
been employed in several states, the state in which the unem-
ployed worker files his claim for benefits becomes the paying
state "if the claimant qualifies for unemployment benefits in
that State on the basis of combined employment and wages."37
If the claimant does not qualify under that criterion, the state
where he was last employed must be the paying state.38 Fur-
thermore, if the claimant files a combined-wage claim for
benefits in Canada, then the last state in which the claimant
was employed is still the paying state.39
A "transferring state" is a state in which a combined wage
claimant had covered employment and wages during the base
period of a paying state.40 The transferring state would then
31. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 616 (1995). These regulations have been amended at least
three times. See 45 Fed. Reg. 47,109 (July 11, 1980) (revising responsibilities of the
paying state and clarifying benefit charges); 43 Fed. Reg. 2625 (Jan. 17, 1978) (alter-
ing rules to accommodate work in the Virgin Islands and to allow charges to the
federal government for ex-civil servants and ex-military personnel); 39 Fed. Reg.
45,214 (Dec. 31, 1974) (revising definition of "paying state" to ensure increased benefit
payments to claimants and to ease administration of combined-wage claims).
32. 20 C.F.R. § 616.1.
33. Id. § 616.1(a).
34. Id. § 616.4.
35. Id. § 616.3.
36. Id. § 616.4.
37. Id. § 616.6(e)(1).
38. Id. § 616.6(e)(2).
39. Id. Apparently, when § 616.6 was first promulgated, the Secretary of Labor
still had not approved unemployment compensation laws for the Virgin Islands; the
regulation has not been amended to indicate that approval has been granted. See id.
40. Id. § 616.6(f).
490
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"transfer" this employment and corresponding wages to the
paying state, which may determine the benefit rights of the
claimant under the paying state's law.4
A claimant with employment covered under the unemploy-
ment compensation laws of two or more states may choose to
file a combined-wage claim for benefits.42 For example, suppose
that a claimant worked six months in Michigan and eight
months in Georgia. After becoming unemployed, he files for
benefits in Kentucky. This claimant may file the combined-wage
claim, regardless of whether or not he had sufficient covered
employment under the laws of either Michigan or Georgia
alone. The claimant might not be monetarily eligible in Ken-
tucky unless the wages of Georgia and Michigan are com-
bined.4" In addition, this claimant may not file a combined-wage
claim in Kentucky if he has unused benefit rights for that
benefit year in another state.44 For example, if the claimant had
previously filed an unemployment compensation claim during
the benefit year in Georgia and was again employed in that
state before exhausting those benefits, he could not file a
combined-wage claim in Kentucky after becoming unemployed.45
Suppose this combined-wage claimant subsequently believes
that he would receive more benefits by not filing the com-
bined-wage claim. He may withdraw his claim under certain
conditions.4" First, the claimant must withdraw his claim
within the time allowed to file an appeal, protest, or request
for redetermination under the law of the paying state. 47 Sec-
ond, the claimant must repay in full any benefits paid or au-
thorize the state against whom he will file a substitute claim
to repay the initial paying state out of benefits due under the
substitute claim.48
In processing the combined-wage claim, the paying state must
request from all previous states a transfer of the claimant's
employment and wages accumulated during the paying state's
base period. 49 The paying state shall determine entitlement to
41. Id.
42. Id. § 616.7(a).
43. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 341.090,341.350(5) (Michie 1995) (delineating base
period qualification).
44. See 20 C.F.R. § 616.7(a)(2).
45. Id. § 616.7(a).
46. Id. § 616.7(d).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. § 616.8(a).
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benefits under its own law, even if the claimant had no earn-
ings in that state.5" The paying state shall give notice of deter-
mination on benefits.5 Appeals are determined in accordance
with the laws of the paying state,52 except where the appeal
involves a dispute as to coverage in the transferring state, in
which case the transferring state will determine the appeal in
accordance with its own law.53
C. State Law Inadequacies in Interstate Claims:
Kentucky Law as an Example
Federal regulations fail to deal with several problems in-
herent in interstate claims-problems which are not remedied
in state regulations either. This Article brings some of these
problems to light in the following discussion of Kentucky law.
Although Kentucky law is not necessarily the archetypal unem-
ployment compensation law, problems in even one of the fifty-
three jurisdictions participating in the Interstate Benefit
Payment Plan' threaten the integrity of the entire system.
Kentucky complies with federal law in allowing the filing of
interstate claims.55 The Kentucky Administrative Regulations
require the interstate claimant to be registered for work, as
required by the laws and regulations of the agent state, i.e. the
state where the claimant signs up for benefits.5" By meeting the
registration requirements of the agent state, the claimant will
automatically meet the requirements of the liable state, i.e. the
state where the claimant worked but not where he filed.5" The
agent state will inform the liable state whether or not the
claimant meets the agent state's requirements.
5 8
An interstate claimant may file an interstate claim for bene-
fits on uniform interstate claim forms and under uniform
50. Id.
51. Id. § 616.8(b).
52. Id. § 616.8(d)(1).
53. Id. § 616.8(d)(3).
54. See supra note 31; 26 US.C. § 3304(a)(9)(B).
55. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 341.145(3) (Michie 1995); 903 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 5:170
(1994).
56. 903 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 5:170, §§ 2(4), 3.
57. Id. §§ 2(5), 3(1).
58. Id. § 3(2).
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procedures developed according to the Interstate Benefit Pay-
ment Plan.59 The claim shall be filed at the appropriate local
employment office of the agent state, at an itinerant point, or
by mail.60 The agent state shall "ascertain and report to the
liable state" those facts that relate to the "claimant's availability
for work and eligibility for benefits."6' The agent state's respon-
sibility is limited to reporting and investigating relevant facts.6 2
With regard to appeals, "[t]he agent state shall afford all
reasonable cooperation in taking of evidence and the holding of
hearings."63 In determining whether an appeal is timely filed,
an appeal will be considered made and communicated to the
liable state on the date on which it is received by any qualified
officer of the agent state. 4
These regulations leave noticeable omissions. For example,
Kentucky law does not require a hearing officer in the agent
state to make findings of fact regarding a claimant's availability
for work and monetary eligibility for benefits; nor does Ken-
tucky law require a hearing officer to make findings on whether
an appeal was timely filed. While the liable state's law controls
on most issues, the agent state's law controls on registration for
work requirements-yet Kentucky law does not define the
agent state's role with clarity. 5 Without federal regulations for
reference, all parties-the claimant, the employer, and the
states-have no guidance for resolving conflicts of laws, contest-
ed facts arising in the agent state, or other issues discussed in
this Article.
II. INTERSTATE FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Case Example Involving Combined-Wage Claims
Even though the federal regulations clearly state that the
paying state's law controls6 in a combined-wage claim, the
59. Id. § 5(1).
60. Id. § 5(3).
61. Id. § 6(1).
62. Id. § 6(2).
63. Id. § 7(1).
64. Id. § 7(2).
65. Id. §§ 3, 6, 7.
66. 20 C.F.R. § 616.8(a) (1995).
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following case resulted differently, causing confusion over
whether the paying state's or transferring state's law controls.
Therefore, the USDOL or Congress should clarify the law gov-
erning interstate claims.
Benjamin Rose Institute v. District Unemployment Compensa-
tion Board (Benjamin Rose I) involved Valdon Walker, Jr., who
entered the Army in 1971 and, upon completing his military
duty, began working for the Benjamin Rose Institute in Cleve-
land, Ohio, in January 1973.67 In June 1973, Walker voluntarily
left work to attend graduate school; but in February 1974, he
left school and applied for unemployment compensation in
Washington, D.C.6' Initially, the District Unemployment Com-
pensation Board (DUCB) determined that Walker was eligible
for twenty-two dollars per week, based solely on his military
service.6 9 But Walker also filed a combined-wage claim for
increased unemployment benefits. After combining his military
wages and employment with his Ohio wages and employment,
the DUCB increased Walker's unemployment benefits from
twenty-two dollars per week to eighty dollars per week.7 °
Two hearings were held on the Institute's appeal-one in
Ohio and one in Washington, D.C.71 At the Ohio hearing, the
employer's representative testified that, under Ohio law, Walk-
er was disqualified from receiving benefits because he volun-
tarily quit work without good cause.72 After this hearing, the
referee forwarded the hearing transcript to the DUCB. v3
The DUCB conducted its own hearing, at which the
Institute's attorney and Walker were present. 74 The examiner
ruled that the correct procedure for determining Walker's
benefits was to apply District of Columbia law both to his
military service and to his Ohio employment. So under District
of Columbia law, the examiner determined that Walker had
good cause to leave his Ohio employment. 75 Because the
employer hired Walker knowing that he intended to work only
until he returned to school, the examiner reasoned that
67. 338 A.2d 104, 104 (D.C. 1975).
68. Id.
69. Id. Walker's unemployment benefits as a former servicemember were based on
5 U.S.C. §§ 8501(1)(B), 8502 (1970). Id. at 106.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 105.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
494
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Walker had good cause to quit and was not disqualified from
receiving benefits.7"
The Institute argued to the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals that the law of Ohio rather than the law of the District of
Columbia should apply." The Institute conceded that Walker
qualified for benefits in the District of Columbia solely based
on his military employment. However, the Institute also argued
that Walker's military wages were simply assigned to the
District of Columbia rather than earned there."v If the military
wages were "assigned," the District of Columbia apparently had
no right to apply its own law in this combined-wage claim.
Although the court of appeals concluded that Ohio law should
control, it reached its decision under a different theory.79 The
District of Columbia, by regulation, "entered into an agreement
with the Secretary of Labor to pay unemployment compensa-
tion to exservicemen (UCX)."0 Under this regulation, military
service and wages are considered under the unemployment
compensation law of the state to which they are assigned.8'
Accordingly, military service was considered as employment
within the District of Columbia under the interstate arrange-
ment. 2
The DUCB argued that the District of Columbia's law con-
trolled and that the DUCB should interpret Ohio law in that
process. 8 Federal regulation provides that the District of
Columbia, as the paying state, shall apply its own law, even if
the combined-wage claimant has no covered earnings in that
state.8 The court concluded that this proposition controls only
"if there is a disparity between the state base periods upon
which benefits are to be determined"; 5 the court gave no reason
for this conclusion, except to say that the federal regulations
control. This regulation would not control, however, where there
is a dispute about the amount of employment and wages subject
to transfer by the transferring state, i.e. Ohio.86 Rather, when
76. Id.
77. Id. at 105-06.
78. Id. at 106 (relying on 5 US.C. § 8522 (1970)).
79. Id. at 106-07.
80. Id. at 106.
81. Id. at 107 (relying on 20 C.F.R. § 614.13 (1970)).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 616.8 (1974)).
85. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 616.8(d)(3), which covers appeals).
86. Id.
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an appeal involves a dispute as to the coverage of the
employing unit or services in a transferring state, the appeal
would be decided by the transferring state under its own law.
8 7
Under the court's interpretation, Ohio, as the transferring state,
would determine whether the claimant's Ohio employment was
subject to transfer to the District of Columbia.8 The case was
remanded to the DUCB for further proceedings.89
On remand, the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services re-
sponded to the DUCB's request for information as follows: (1)
Walker's wages had been correctly transferred to the District of
Columbia, (2) the Institute had no right under Ohio law to object
to or appeal from the transfer of wages, and (3) Walker's eligibil-
ity for combined wages was to be determined under District of
Columbia law.9 ° After another hearing, the DUCB again allowed
the claimant to receive unemployment compensation, again
holding that under District of Columbia law the claimant's
reason for leaving employment was not disqualifying. 9'
On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals noted
that, under Ohio law, Walker's reasons for leaving his em-
ployment would not be considered good cause and would dis-
qualify him from receiving unemployment benefits in Ohio.9 2
Because the court had previously held that Ohio law controlled
on this point, it reversed the second DUCB decision and denied
benefits on Walker's combined-wage claim.93
These decisions show that the USDOL needs to clarify the pos-
sible conflict between 20 C.F.R. § 616.8(a)94 and § 616.8(d)(3), 95
neither of which has changed significantly since the two decisions
in Benjamin Rose Institute.' After all, § 616.8(a) provides that
the paying state's law controls, even if the combined-wage
claimant has no earnings in that state.97 On the other hand,
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Benjamin Rose Inst. v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 355 A.2d 569,
570 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. The DUCB had relied on this rule to argue that District of Columbia law con-
trolled. Benjamin Rose I, 338 A.2d at 107.
95. The court used this rule to determine that Ohio law controlled. Id.
96. Compare id. with 20 C.F.R. §§ 616.8(a), 616.8(d)(3) (1995).
97. 20 C.F.R. § 616.8(a). "The paying State shall apply all the provisions of its law
to each determination made hereunder, even if the Combined-Wage Claimant has no
earnings in covered employment in that State.... ." Id.
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§ 616.8(d)(3) provides that the transferring state's law controls
in limited circumstances, such as in protests or appeals regard-
ing coverage of the employing unit.98 Yet, the only exception to
the proposition that a paying state's law controls in § 616.8(a)
is when the transferring state has adjudicated an issue prior to
transferring the claim; in such a case, a paying state may not
redetermine an issue.99 However, this exception does not apply
if the transferring state's determination made possible a com-
bined-wage claim where the claimant's rights to benefits have
been postponed.' Therefore, it appears that under § 616.8(a)
the paying state's law should control in almost every case.
B. Interstate Cases Involving No Combined Wages
Up to this point, this Article has examined what happens
when the claimant has worked in several states and files a
combined-wage claim. This Article will now consider issues
that arise when a claimant has worked in only one state but
later files a claim for benefits in another state.
Unlike in combined-wage claims, federal regulations do not
apply to most interstate claims filed. In most interstate cases,
the claimant has worked in one state, became unemployed, and
then files a claim for benefits in another state. 101 As noted
earlier, the FUTA prohibits states from denying benefits solely
because the claimant files an interstate claim.
10 2
The principle of prohibiting the denial of benefits when the
sole objection is that the claim is an interstate claim was
interpreted in Barr v. United States.' In that case, Dorothy
Davis Barr sued the United States Secretary of Labor, the
Employment Security Commission of New Mexico, and the
Industrial Commissioner of the New York State Department of
Labor.0 4 Barr had terminated employment in New York and
then filed an interstate claim for unemployment benefits in
98. Id. § 616.8(d)(3).
99. Id. § 616.8(a).
100. Id.
101. Cf supra text accompanying note 1.
102. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(9)(A) (1994).
103. 478 F.2d 1152 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
104. Id. at 1154.
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New Mexico. She argued that she was entitled to have her
employer's witnesses subpoenaed from New York to New Mexi-
co where they could be subject to cross-examination, because
otherwise she would be denied a fair hearing and wrongly
denied benefits solely because she filed an interstate claim.
10 5
Additionally, she contended that the procedures of both states,
which did not provide for out-of-state witness subpoenas,
violated her constitutional due process rights and her right to
a fair hearing under the federal statute. 10 6 The district court
dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim.0 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
upheld the dismissal on several grounds.' 8 Its most significant
conclusion was that federal law does not require New Mexico to
subpoena witnesses from New York before an interstate claim
may be decided.0 9 Rather, the court held that federal law only
requires that a claimant be permitted to give testimony in her
current state of residence and transmit the testimony to the
liable state.110
In Simmons v. District Unemployment Compensation Board,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals determined whether
demeanor evidence might be important in a hearing of an
interstate claim where all of the claimant's employment was in
another state."' Raymond Simmons worked in Gainesville,
Florida, as a lumber warehouseman and was discharged for
allegedly reporting to work under the influence of alcohol.
Subsequently, Simmons filed a claim for unemployment com-
pensation in the District of Columbia. When the District Unem-
ployment Compensation Board's (DUCB) Claims Deputy ruled
that Simmons was disqualified for misconduct, Simmons filed
an appeal and requested a hearing." 2 An evidentiary hearing
was conducted before a Florida appeals referee, and the employ-
er and the claimant presented conflicting evidence. The Florida
appeals referee merely recorded the testimony, making no
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1154-55.
108. Id. at 1155-56.
109. Id. at 1156.
110. Id.
111. 292 A.2d 797, 799 (D.C. 1972).
112. Id.
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findings of fact or conclusions about the conflicting testimony.ll3
The DUCB Examiner listened to a recording of this testi-
mony and concluded that the claimant had been drinking on
the job and was disqualified because of work-related miscon-
duct."4 The DUCB never saw the claimant or his supervisor, so
it had no opportunity to observe the demeanor of either party,
while the Florida referee, who had the opportunity to observe
the demeanor of both, made no credibility findings." 5 The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded that this
method of review was inappropriate where the trier of fact was
unable to observe the demeanor of the witnesses in making a
decision about the witnesses' credibility and where credibility
is a significant issue in deciding a claim.' Therefore, the court
reversed the decision and granted the benefits claim."7
As the court in Simmons concluded, the ability of the finder
of fact to observe the demeanor of both parties is significant.
When a board reviews decisions where the parties testified in
person, it is likely that the reviewing board will defer to the
referees' observations of demeanor. Therefore, it is important in
interstate claims that the fact finder make such findings before
the case is transmitted to the liable state which will make
conclusions of law.
In Dowd v. Director of the Division of Employment Security,"8
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed the
similar issue of which state should resolve conflicting testimony
where the liable state delegates fact finding to the agent state.
The claimant, James Dowd, had worked in Massachusetts,
where he filed a claim for unemployment benefits. On July 31,
1981, a claims director in the Division of Employment Security
(DES) office in Massachusetts gave Dowd notice that he was
disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation. 119 At
that time, Dowd told the claims director that he would be
moving to Pennsylvania and was concerned about Massachu-
setts' ten-day deadline for filing an appeal. The claims director
assured Dowd that he could file his appeal in Pennsylvania and
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 459 N.E.2d 471 (Mass. 1984).
119. Id. at 472.
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that the Massachusetts office would forward his records. On
August 4 and 13, 1981, Dowd reported to the unemployment
security office in Pennsylvania, where he did not file his appeal
until August 17, 1981.120
A hearing was held in Pennsylvania to determine whether
the claimant had good cause for failing to appeal in ten days.'2 '
Both Dowd and a representative of the Pennsylvania employ-
ment security office appeared at the hearing. 2 2 A DES examin-
er in Massachusetts reviewed this Pennsylvania testimony as
well as the exhibits and concluded that Dowd did not have good
cause to file a late appeal. 12 Accordingly, DES denied his claim
for unemployment benefits.
124
Before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Dowd
argued that neither the review examiner nor the DES board of
review made findings of fact on the crucial issue of what had
happened at the Pennsylvania office on August 4.125 He con-
tended that he was told that he could not appeal until his
records arrived from Massachusetts. The court concluded that
the procedure followed in this case was defective and that the
review examiner erred.
126
The court recognized that a worker who loses his job in the
liable state may collect unemployment benefits even though he
resides in the agent state. 12' As required by federal law, both
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania participated in the Interstate
Benefit Payment Plan.12 Under Massachusetts' procedural
rules, the agent state, Pennsylvania, was responsible for inves-
tigating and reporting relevant facts. 29
In this case, the hearing officer in Pennsylvania should have
made significant factual and credibility determinations, includ-
ing whether the claimant was really told that he would have to
wait until his records arrived from Massachusetts and whether
standard procedure was followed.' 0 While the examiner for the
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. The representative had never met with Dowd on his earlier visits to the
office. Id.
123. Id. Massachusetts law would have extended his time to appeal from 10 days
to 30 days for good cause. Id. at 472 n.3.
124. Id. at 472.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 473.
130. See id.
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agent state could not determine the issue of law of whether
Dowd had good cause for a late appeal, that examiner should
have resolved the conflicts in testimony at the evidentiary
hearing.'3 ' Accordingly, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts remanded the case so that Pennsylvania, as the
agent state, could resolve the conflicting testimony.'32
Whereas federal regulations provide procedural requirements
in resolving combined-wage claims, federal law leaves an
interpretative gap for all other interstate claims. These cases
provide some guidance for determining the responsibilities of
the agent state and the liable state when wages are not com-
bined, but perhaps federal law should govern these types of
cases as well.
III. DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS
Federal unemployment compensation law requires states to
provide an opportunity for a fair hearing if unemployment
compensation benefits are denied.' Due process rights in
administrative hearings commonly include: (1) notice of the
issues; (2) the right to present evidence and argument; (3) the
right to cross-examine so as to rebut adverse evidence; (4) the
right to appear with counsel; (5) the right to have a decision
based only on the evidence of record at the hearing; and (6) the
right to have a complete record of the testimony, evidence, and
exhibits.13 4
A. Attorney Representation in Interstate Claims
Without an attorney to secure these rights, however, due
process is all but unattainable. In Simmons v. Traughber, the
Tennessee Supreme Court discussed the right to appear with an
attorney in intrastate unemployment compensation claims. 3 5 In
131. Id.
132. See id. at 473-74.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(3) (1994).
134. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 203-04 (2d ed. 1984).
135. 791 S.W.2d 21, 22-26 (Tenn. 1990). Although this is an intrastate case, its
ruling should apply with even greater force in interstate cases.
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1987, Cornelia Simmons was discharged, allegedly for poor
work performance and absenteeism.' She appealed an initial
denial of unemployment benefits, and the notice of her appeal
advised her of her right to be represented by counsel at her own
expense. 3 7 The employer appeared at the Appeals Tribunal
hearing with counsel and with witnesses, while Simmons
appeared without counsel and without witnesses. 38 The referee
informed Simmons that she had the right to cross-examine and
testify on her own behalf but did not mention her right to
representation.1 3 9 Simmons did not learn of the Legal Services
office in Columbia, Tennessee, until after this hearing. Her
request for rehearing on the grounds of a lack of counsel was
denied. 1
40
The Tennessee Supreme Court declined to reach the consti-
tutional issues and instead interpreted the statutory require-
ments of a fair hearing.' The court noted that the right to be
heard includes the right to be represented by counsel, and that,
for the right to counsel to be meaningful, claimants must know
that the right exists.4 The court characterized the notice,
which advised Simmons of the right to be represented by
counsel at her own expense, as "negative and misleading,"
because for many unemployed claimants, such a notice would
end their interest in obtaining an attorney. "43 Additionally, the
court stated that Tennessee public policy would be furthered by
notifying individuals unemployed through no fault of their own
of the possible availability of free or low-cost legal counsel.'"
Accordingly, the court held that future notices in Tennessee
must advise claimants that if they cannot afford legal counsel,
free or low-cost counsel may be available. 45
As Simmons indicates, a notice that an attorney may be
available at free or at low cost is an important element of due
process to provide the claimant a fair hearing. This is equally
true for interstate claimants. Yet, federal law does not require
notice to interstate claimants as to how they may obtain free or
low-cost legal counsel in the liable state. As a legal services
136. Id. at 23.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 24.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 25.
145. Id. at 25-26.
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lawyer in Kentucky, I have had difficulty assisting interstate
claimants in obtaining free or low-cost representation in the
liable state. Even assuming the liable state allows the claimant
to be represented by a person not licensed to practice law in
that state, I would be very hesitant to attempt to represent a
claimant in a different liable state, even through a telephonic
hearing. The law library in my area of Kentucky only contains
four states' statutes and does not include their administrative
regulations. Without the ability to be competent in the laws of
fifty-two other jurisdictions, I would probably violate the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court's Rules of Professional Conduct 146 were I
to represent interstate claimants where Kentucky is not the
liable state. A notice of hearing, therefore, must describe how
to obtain free or low-cost legal representation in the state whose
laws will apply.
B. Subpoenas for Witnesses in Interstate Hearings
The failure to provide a method of witness subpoenas in an
interstate hearing can also constitute a denial of due process.'47
In a Louisiana case, the claimants worked ten to twelve hours
per day, five days per week as truck drivers hauling rice.'48 On
June 24, 1982, they reported for work in Louisiana and were
told to pick up a load of rice from Mississippi. When they
arrived in Mississippi, no one was available to load the
trucks. 4 9 Their employer instructed them to wait overnight in
Mississippi. 50 Because they were not paid by the hour, they
refused to stay overnight, and the employer discharged them.'
51
The claimants had two coworkers who could have testified to
the incident that led to their discharges, and one was still
working with the employer.'52 After initial denials of benefits,
the claimants received a notice of a telephonic hearing on their
appeal.' The notice instructed that their witnesses had to be
146. KENTUCKY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1995).
147. See supra text accompanying note 134.
148. Schexnider v. Blache, 506 So. 2d 864, 864 (La. 1987).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 865.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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available to testify at the claimants' telephones but did not
instruct how to subpoena witnesses.
154
The Louisiana Supreme Court stated that the right of a
claimant to present rebuttal evidence is important in a fair
hearing. 5 5 Because the claimants were not told how to sub-
poena essential witnesses, the court remanded the case so that
the referee might allow the claimants either to have the wit-
nesses subpoenaed for a telephonic hearing or to have the
witnesses give their depositions.
156
Similarly, an interstate claimant who testifies in person or
through a telephonic hearing must be allowed to subpoena
necessary witnesses or documents in order to have a fair hear-
ing. The question is how a claimant might apply a subpoena
across jurisdictions. For example, how does a claimant who
worked in Florida subpoena a necessary witness who lives in
Georgia after she files an interstate claim in Michigan? Federal
standards are needed so that claimants will be able to subpoena
necessary witnesses and documents in all states.
C. Interstate Claimant's Right to Judicial Review
Whether an unemployment compensation claimant is entitled
to judicial review depends on which state's law controls. A
claimant is entitled to have a fair hearing when her right to
unemployment compensation is denied.'57 Intrastate claimants
and employers expect the right to judicial review if they receive
an unfavorable decision at the administrative level.
58
Consider this hypothetical situation of an interstate claimant:
A combined-wage claimant, who worked in Georgia and Ala-
bama, files an interstate claim for unemployment compensation
in Kentucky. The claimant has not worked in Kentucky, but
Kentucky law applies. 159 Suppose that the claimant has admin-
istrative hearings that result in a decision for the employer.
After exhausting administrative appeals, the claimant may seek
154. Id.
155. Id. at 865-66.
156. Id. at 867.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(3) (1994).
158. In Kentucky, for example, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 341.450 (Michie 1995) confers
this right as a statutory matter.
159. 20 C.F.R. § 616.8(a) (1995).
FALL 1995-WINTER 1996]
judicial review in Kentucky. To seek judicial review there, the
claimant must file a verified complaint against the Kentucky
Unemployment Insurance Commission and the employer in the
circuit court of the county in which she was last employed
within twenty days after the Commission's decision.160 The
Kentucky Supreme Court has stated, however, that "[t]here is
no appeal to the courts from an action of an administrative
agency as a matter of right."' 6 ' When a statute specifies how
the appeal is to be commenced, the appellant must follow strict
compliance with the statute; otherwise, the circuit court lacks
jurisdiction to review the case.' 62 Thus, for example, a claim-
ant's failure to name the employer in the complaint is fatal to
the claim, even when the employer has notice of all proceed-
ings.'63 Moreover, where a claimant in Kentucky fails to follow
the statutory requirement of having the complaint verified, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals has held on several occasions that
the court also lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of the
appeal.64
In our hypothetical case, therefore, a combined-wage claimant
who has never worked in Kentucky, the paying state, most
likely has no right to seek judicial review if Kentucky judicial
review is strictly construed, because she cannot file in the
county of last employ. Or, if Kentucky law also applies to an
interstate claimant's job registration requirements, the claimant
would have no right to seek judicial review under Kentucky law
because, again, the claimant must file the appeal in the Ken-
tucky county in which she was last employed. Because she was
never employed in Kentucky, she cannot request judicial re-
view. Judicial review is not explicitly required by federal law
under the right to a fair hearing, and these plausible hypo-
theticals show that Kentucky law would in effect deny an
interstate claimant the right to judicial review. Federal law
could assure that states allow judicial review for interstate
claimants.
160. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 341.450.
161. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Carter, 689 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Ky.
1985) (emphasis omitted).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 361, 363.
164. E.g., Fisher v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 880 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1994); Monyhan v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 709 S.W.2d 837,
837 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Pickhart v. United States Post Office, 664 S.W.2d 939, 940 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1983).
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IV. COMPARISON BETWEEN CHOICE-OF-LAw RULES
FOR UNEMPLOYED FEDERAL WORKERS
AND INTERSTATE CLAIMANTS
Federal provisions regulate unemployment compensation
claims for both federal civilians (UCFE) and former military
servicemembers (UCX).'65 Because of the need for federal-state
coordination, federal regulations dictate which state's law
applies, depending on where and when the federal civilian or
servicemember was employed. 6 6 The regulations specify which
state's law will apply to the various issues of unemployment
compensation, including claims filings, notices of determination,
ability and availability for work, and disqualifications. 167 For
interstate UCFE and UCX claims, the claimant is referred to
the regulations on combined-wage claimants and to the Inter-
state Benefit Payment Plan.
168
Federal employees, therefore, are obviously affected by state
laws regarding interstate claims. The importance of mentioning
this in passing is that the regulations on choice of law for the
UCFE and UCX programs appear in many ways to be clearer
than those for interstate claimants, whereas no federal regula-
tions pertain to choice-of-law rules for most other interstate
claimants. Only one regulation covers claimants who have
worked in several states for purposes of combined-wage claims
for benefits.'69 As noted earlier, at least one court has interpret-
ed this regulation; however, the intended result can also be
ambiguous. 7 '
V. SUMMARY AND SUGGESTED REFORMS
Federal regulations govern claimants with combined wages
in interstate claims but do not otherwise cover interstate
165. 5 U.S.C. § 8501 (1994). The unemployed federal civilian program is referred to
as UCFE (Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees). 20 C.F.R. § 609.1(a)
(1995). The unemployed former servicemember program is referred to as UCX (Unem-
ployment Compensation for Ex-servicemembers). Id. § 614.1(a).
166. 20 C.F.R. §§ 609.8(a), 614.8(a) (1995).
167. Id. §§ 609.9, 614.9.
168. See id. §§ 609.9(b), 609.9(c), 614.9(b), 614.9(c).
169. See id. pt. 616.
170. See supra Part II.
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claimants. Uniform regulations on which state's law is to apply
to all interstate claims would address many of the problems
highlighted in this Article. Both the UCFE and UCX programs
give clearer ideas on how to promulgate regulations deter-
mining which state's laws will apply to an interstate claim.
Moreover, the case law discussing agent state and liable state
responsibilities could be codified in order to clarify the
responsibilities of each state. Although combined-wage regula-
tions provide some guidance, the regulations still need clarifi-
cation as to when the law of the transferring state controls
and when the law of the paying state controls.
Finally, a fair hearing in unemployment compensation im-
plies the right to notice, the right to present evidence, the right
to cross-examine, the right to counsel, the right to a decision
based on the evidence, and the right to have a complete record
made.' 7 ' This means that an interstate claimant must have
notice of how to obtain free or low-cost legal counsel from the
liable state, that telephonic hearings need clear standards,'
72
that a claimant should have the means to subpoena necessary
witnesses and documents to the administrative hearing, and
that the interstate claimant should have the right to seek
judicial review.
Our mobile society ensures that some individuals will seek
work in more than one state. When a worker loses a job and
needs to file for benefits in another state, unemployment com-
pensation becomes more complex. Complexity might provoke
stimulating intellectual debate, but it wreaks havoc for the
legal practitioner with limited resources. More regulations of
uniform application from the USDOL or laws from Congress
could address these problems.
171. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
172. Telephone hearings are discussed in an accompanying article in this Sympo-
sium. See Allan A. Toubman et al., Due Process Implications of Telephone Hearings:
The Case for an Individualized Approach to Scheduling Telephone Hearings, 29 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 407 (1996).
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